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In deregulated electricity markets, generation companies (GENCOs) make unit commit-
ment (UC) decisions based on a profit maximization objective in what is termed profit
based unit commitment (PBUC). PBUC is done for the GENCOs demand which is a
summation of its bilateral demand and allocations from the spot energy market. While
the bilateral demand is known, allocations from the spot energy market depend on the
GENCOs bidding strategy. A GENCO thus requires an optimal bidding strategy (OBS)
which when combined with a PBUC approach would maximize operating profits. In this
paper, a solution of the combined OBS-PBUC problem is presented. An evolutionary par-
ticle swarm optimization (EPSO) algorithm is implemented for solving the optimization
problem. Simulation results carried out for a test power system with GENCOs of dif-
fering market strengths show that the optimal bidding strategy depends on the GENCOs
market power. Larger GENCOs with significant market power would typically bid higher
to raise market clearing prices while smaller GENCOs would typically bid lower to cap-
ture a larger portion of the spot market demand. It is also illustrated that the proposed
EPSO algorithm has a better performance in terms of solution quality than the classical
PSO algorithm.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, one of the most important aspects of power system operation is the prior scheduling of
generating units also referred to as unit commitment (UC) [1, 2, 3]. UC schedules are usually determined on a
week-ahead, day-ahead, or even just a few hours before operation. Prior scheduling of generating units increases
efficiency by ensuring a least-cost operating regime while keeping system reliability. In traditional, regulated
environments, UC is done from a “least-cost” point-of-view [4]. While in the very short-term rule-of-thumb
methods can be applied, power utilities usually invest in system optimization software as the extra cost resulting
from non-optimal operation could be significant.
UC in deregulated markets take a different approach. Unlike the regulated environment, the independent
system operator (ISO) who is in charge of ensuring that demand is met does not own or operate any generating
units [5, 6]. The ISO receives supply bids from the various generation companies (GENCOs) in the system and
then allocates the demand to these GENCOs based on a cheapest-first method. The GENCOs in the system thus
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in the ISO operated energy market (spot market), GENCOs may independently negotiate bilateral supply contracts
with consumers though they may have to use the ISO’s transmission network to deliver agreed power [6].
Each individual GENCO still has to draw up its own generations schedules especially because operational
constraints on generating units such as minimum-up time or minimum-down times could significantly eat into a
GENCOs profit if not properly considered in the operational planning stage. A GENCO’s UC schedule is based
on expected own demand from both the spot and bilateral energy markets with the aim of maximizing profits [7].
Thus, in deregulated markets, UC is done from a profit maximization point of view hence the term profit based unit
commitment (PBUC) [8]. However, the allocation from the spot energy market depends largely on a GENCO’s
bidding strategy [9]. The GENCO may either lower its bids aiming to increase its allocation or raise its bids so
as to raise the electricity prices which means that the GENCO’s own demand and hence its UC schedule depends
significantly on its adopted bidding strategy.
An important determinant of a GENCO’s bidding strategy in the spot market is its market power i.e. the
GENCO’s ability to alter the market price and allocations in the market. A GENCO whose actions cannot affect
the market equilibrium is referred to a price taker and conversely, a GENCO whose actions significantly affect the
market is referred to as a price maker. Electricity markets usually assume an oligopolistic structure characterized
by several price takers and one or two price makers; usually large companies that are offshoots of the previous
regional or national utilities prior to deregulation [10]. Since the GENCO’s market power can influence the market
price, it is a significant consideration in the determination of an optimal bidding strategy (OBS) and hence the
solution of the PBUC problem.
Several approaches for the solution of the PBUC problem have been proposed in literature. Classical
mathematical methods such as Priority Listing (PL), Dynamic Programming (DP), Branch and Bound, Mixed
Integer Programming (MIP), and Lagrangian Relaxation have been proposed in [11, 12]. Newer, heuristic based
methods such as Genetic Algorithm (GA), Ant colony optimization (ACO), Particle swarm optimization (PSO),
and Artificial bee colony (ABC) have been proposed in [13, 14, 15]. Hybrid methods that combine two or more
solution approaches have also been proposed [16, 17].
Heuristic based methods provide the advantages of a more thorough search of the solution space and being
less prone to getting stuck at local optimum solutions. Also, there is a reduced mathematical computation burden
since these method don’t require the computation of gradients which may be quite difficult in certain instances.
The evolutionary particle swarm optimization (EPSO) algorithm [18, 19, 20], which combines the classical PSO
algorithm with evolutionary programming (EP) concepts, is one of the most promising algorithms for the solution
of various power system operation optimization problems. It has been shown that EPSO has better convergence
characteristics than the conventional PSO and usually gives better results. In this paper, an EPSO algorithm
based solution methodology is proposed to solve the combined optimal bidding strategy and PBUC problem. The
application of the proposed solution methodology is illustrated for several GENCOs of differing sizes operating in
a test power system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2. introduces the concept of GENCO bidding
strategies in electricity markets with an illustration of how a GENCO can set its bidding strategy to increase its
profits. Section 3. introduces the general EPSO algorithm. The problem formulation is given in section 4. and the
proposed solution algorithm in section 5.. Numerical simulations are presented in section 6. while conclusions are
given in section 7..
2. GENCO BIDDING STRATEGIES IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
In deregulated electricity markets, electric energy is sold either through bilateral agreements between
GENCOs and consumers or through an electricity pool operated by an independent system operator i.e. the elec-
tricity spot market [21]. In the case of the bilateral market, the buyer and seller agree on a transaction price from
which the GENCO meets all costs for transmission, distribution, and other ancillary services. The electricity pool
is however operated by an independent system operator ISO who receives and aggregates hourly energy supply
bids from GENCOs and hourly demand bids from consumers after which a market clearing price (MCP) is deter-
mined [6]. The GENCOs are allocated portions of the demand based on a cheapest-bid first while ensuring system
reliability and security. The MCP is defined as the cost of supplying the last MW of demand and all GENCOs who
receive load allocations for the given hour are paid at this price irrespective of their bids.
Each GENCO will combine the bilateral demand with the allocation from the spot market as its own
demand and from this data draw up a UC schedule based on a profit maximization objective. Since the spot
market allocation is based largely on the GENCO’s bid and those of its competitors, the GENCO bid decisions
significantly affect its allocation and hence its profits. Should a GENCO have enough influence, it could affect the
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market clearing price and consequently its profits. The magnitude of this influence defines the GENCO’s market
power. Under perfect competition, so as to maximize its profits, a GENCO should bid at its marginal cost (cost
of supplying an extra MW of electricity) [9]. However, depending on the market environment, the GENCO could
increase its profits in one of two ways:
• The GENCO could lower its bid (bid low) thereby potentially increasing its allocation in the spot market
though this could reduce the MCP. Bidding low is justified if the reduced revenue due to the lower prices is
covered by the increased revenue due to a larger allocation.
• The could raise its bid (bid high) thereby potentially reducing its allocation in the spot market but increasing
the MCP. This is justified if the increased revenue due to the higher prices cover the revenue lost due to a
smaller allocation.
A minimal example to illustrate the spot market dynamics follows next.
The GENCO marginal cost curve forms the basis of its bidding strategy. The marginal cost curve is a plot
of the incremental cost of power generation against the total power output for a GENCO. Mathematically, MCi –





where CT i is the total operating cost of GENCO i when supplying a total of PT i MW. Assuming a quadratic cost















In (2) and (3) aij , bij , and cij are the coefficients of the quadratic cost curves for unit j operated by GENCO i
while Pij is the output of unit j operated by GENCO i.
Consider two GENCOs each owning one generating unit with cost characteristics shown in Table 1. The
marginal cost curves for the two GENCOs are plotted in Figure 1(a) showing that GENCO G1 has the cheaper
generating unit of the two GENCOs. If each GENCO submits its marginal cost curve as its supply curve, the
combined system supply curve will be as shown in Figure 1(b). Assuming a nominal system demand of 200
MW with a linear demand curve as shown in Figure 1(b), the market equilibrium will then be the point at which
the two curves intersect. When read from Figure 1(b) this point is (Pd = 200MW, MCP = $30.78/MWh).
When extrapolated to the supply curves of the two GENCOs, G1 and G2 will supply 144.4 MW and 55.6 MW
respectively.
Table 1. Example GENCO cost characteristics
GENCO Pmini1 P
max
i1 Cost Equation CT i(Pij)
G1 0 300 25P11 + 0.020P 211
G2 0 150 28P21 + 0.025P 221
Now, consider a case where GENCO G1 submits bids where the gradient of its marginal cost curve is
multiplied by a factor µ1. Its bid curve, BC1 is then given by:
BC1 = b11 + µ1 · 2c11P11 = 25 + 0.04µ1P11 (4)
A value of µ1 > 1 raises the bid curve above the nominal meaning that the GENCO bids high while a
value of µ1 < 1 means that the GENCO bids low. The effect of µ1 on the MCP and the GENCO allocations is
illustrated in Figure 2 for values of µ1 = 0.8, and µ1 = 1.2. The results are summarized in Table 2 showing that
as µ1 increases, the MCP increases, GENCO G1’s allocation reduces (as does its revenue and costs) but its profit
increases.
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Figure 1. (a) Marginal cost curves for two GENCOs and (b) market equilibrium obtained from the intersection of
the aggregated supply curve and the system demand curve.






























































Figure 2. Illustration of the effect of GENCO G1’s bid strategy on (a) the demand allocations and (b) the MCP.
Table 2. Effect of GENCO bidding strategy on spot market prices, allocations, revenues, costs, and profits
µ1 MCP P1 Revenue Cost Profit
[$/MWh] [MW] [$/h] [$/h] [$/h]
0.8 30.15 161.01 4, 854.98 4, 543.87 311.11
1.0 30.78 144.44 4, 445.68 4, 028.40 417.28
1.2 31.29 130.97 4, 097.48 3, 617.21 480.27
A plot of the GENCO profit against the value of µi for the two GENCOs acting individually is illustrated
in Figure 3 which shows that the two GENCOs achieve maximum profits at different values of µi (µ1 = 1.9 and
µ2 = 0.6). These results show that the larger GENCO G1 should bid high to increase its profits while conversely,
the smaller GENCO G2 should bid low to increase its profits.
3. EVOLUTIONARY PARTICLE SWARM OPTIMIZATION
Evolutionary particle swarm optimization (EPSO) is a heuristic optimization algorithm based on a com-
bination of the evolutionary programming (EP) and particle swarm optimization (PSO) concepts [18, 19, 22]. As
with the classical PSO algorithm [23], candidate solutions (particles) are moved around the solution space in search
of the best possible solution. Each particle defines a position in the solution space and during successive iterations,
the particles are moved towards the best solutions discovered at the given point in the solution process. The EPSO
particle movement rule used in updating the particle position is similar to the PSO particle update equation in that
a particle moves towards its own personal best solution that it achieved so far (pBest), as well as towards the
global best (gBest) solution which is best among the best solutions achieved so far by all particles present in the
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Figure 3. Illustration of the effect of the bid factor µi on GENCO profits.
population. One important difference in the EPSO algorithm is that the gBest position is “disturbed” hence the
particles don’t just aim for the already found gBest position but rather for the region around the gBest position
which may actually be better than the already found gBest [18].
One of the main challenges of the classical PSO algorithm is parameter tuning i.e. the determination of
the best algorithm parameters to give the best solution. The EPSO algorithm addresses this challenge by progres-
sively “mutating” the weight parameters with successive iterations. Thus, as the algorithm progresses, the weight
parameters also evolve towards the best values. The basic structure of EPSO as originally explained in [18] carries
out the following processes at each iteration:
• REPLICATION - each particle is replicated a number of times.
• MUTATION - each particle has its weights mutated.
• REPRODUCTION - each particle (original and replicas) generates an offspring according to the particle
movement rule using the mutated weights.
• EVALUATION - each offspring has its fitness evaluated.
• SELECTION - the best particles between the original set and the mutated set survive based on a stochastic
tournament to form a new generation.
After a certain pre-set number of iterations (generations), the particle with the global best solution is stored as
the optimal solution. Incorporation of the Darwinistic characteristics of mutation and selection allows the EPSO
algorithm to take advantage of the faster convergence characteristics of Evolutionary Programming (EP) strategies
[19].
4. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Under the deregulated environment each individual GENCO seeks to capture a significant proportion of
the spot electricity market and then determine a generation schedule that maximizes its profit based on expected
prices at each scheduling period. If the GENCO can significantly affect the electricity price at a given hour, then
the GENCO can set up its bid to drive up profits at the specified hour. The GENCO’s decision is then two-fold:
(1) how to set up its bidding strategy either to capture a larger portion of the spot market or to drive up the
electricity price, and (2) how to schedule the generating units to maximize its profit given the expected prices.
This optimization problem is formulated here as an optimal bidding strategy - profit based unit commitment (OBS-
PBUC) problem. Revenues from both the day-ahead spot energy and reserve markets and the GENCO’s bilateral
contract commitments are considered. The objective function and the operational constraints are explained in the
following subsections.
4.1. Objective Function
Profit (PF ) is defined as the difference between revenue (RV ) obtained from sale of energy and reserve
and the total operating cost (TC) of the GENCO. The objective function is thus given as:
Maximize PF = RV − TC. (5)
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4.1.1. GENCO Revenue





RV ph +RV rh
)
, (6)
where RV ph and RV rh are the revenues from the energy market and the reserve market at hour h respectively. H
is the number of hours in the scheduling horizon. RV ph is calculated as:











where αhs and α
h
b are the energy prices at the spot market and bilateral market respectively at hour h, P
h
s and
Phb are the power supplied to the spot market and bilateral market respectively at hour h, and κ is a contract
of differences factor [24]. The first term in (7) represents revenue from the energy sold at the spot market, the
second term represents revenue from bilateral contracts, while the third term represents revenue from contracts
of differences. Contracts of differences are usually included in bilateral contracts to compensate suppliers and
consumers for differences between the bilaterally agreed prices and the prevailing market price [24].
Revenue from reserve sales RV rh is given as:







where αhr is price of reserve capacity at hour h, P
max
j is the maximum capacity of unit j, and P
h
j is the output of
unit j at hour h. N is the total number of generating units. In (8), the same price is assumed for both spinning and
non-spinning reserve. If the pricing is different, the equation could be split to have two terms accounting for each
type of reserve.
4.1.2. GENCO Costs
Total cost TC is a sum of generator fuel costs (FC) and start up costs (SUC) for all N units over the








































In (11) and (12), Uhj is the status of unit j at hour h i.e. U
h
j = 0 if unit j is OFF at hour h and U
h
j = 1 if unit j is
ON at hour h. γj is the start up cost coefficient for unit j which is either the cold start cost CSCj if the duration
unit j has been ON is less than its cold start hour CShrj or the hot start cost HSCj otherwise.
4.2. Operational Constraints
The GENCO operational constraints are given as:
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(b) Generation limit constraints
Uhj P
min
j ≤ Uhj Phj ≤ Uhj Pmaxj ∀i,∀h (14)
(c) Generator ramp up constraints
Phj − Ph−1j ≤ RUj ∀i,∀h (15)
(d) Generator ramp down constraints
Ph−1j − Phj ≤ RDj ∀i,∀h (16)
(e) Generator minimum up time constraints
Uhj = 1 if U
t
j − U t−1j = 1, for h = t, ..., t+MUTj − 1 (17)
(f) Generator minimum down time constraints
Uhj = 0 if U
t−1
j − U tj = 1, for h = t, ..., t+MDTj − 1 (18)
In (15) and (16), RUj and RDj are the hour-to-hour ramp-up and ramp-down limits on unit j respectively. In (17)
and (18), MUTj and MDTj are the minimum-up-time and minimum-down-time limits on unit j respectively.
Constraints (14) to (18) define unit operation limits and are similar to the formulation of a traditional
utility’s cost minimization UC problem [25]. Constraint (13) – the power balance constraint – states that the
GENCO’s total output at any given hour must equal its own load which is the sum of its expected spot market
allocation Phs and its bilateral market commitment P
h
b . While the bilateral market load would typically be agreed
upon long in advance, the spot market allocation would depend on the GENCO’s bidding strategy. A GENCO can
predict the values of Phs and α
h
s using its bidding strategy and the expected competitor bid curves. Generally, P
h
b




s are variables dependent on the market dynamics. A GENCO
would act in the day-ahead market to affect the values of Phs and α
h
s so as to increase its profits.
A second significant difference between the formulations of the OBS-PBUC problem and the traditional
UC problem is the absence of a minimum spinning reserve constraint [25] in the new formulation. This is because,
supply of reserve, as well as other ancillary services, is not the responsibility of the GENCO. The ISO ensures
the supply of such ancillary services by engaging the GENCOs. A GENCO thus gets payments for supply of both
spinning and non-spinning reserve as given in the revenue equation (6). The adequacy of the reserve is ensured by
the ISO by aggregating reserves from all GENCOs participating in the electricity market.
5. OBS-PBUC SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
In this section, the procedure adopted in this paper to solve the OBS-PBUC problem is outlined. Sec-
tion 5.1. explains the procedure adopted to determine the profit corresponding to a given bidding strategy while
section 5.2. details the step-by-step procedure implemented to select an optimal bidding strategy using the EPSO
algorithm.
5.1. Profit Maximization Procedure
As illustrated in section 2., a GENCO can opt to bid high or bid low with respect to its marginal cost curve
aiming to maximize its profits. Assume a linear reference marginal cost curve given by1:
MCref = ρ+ βPhT , (19)
where ρ and β are the marginal cost curve coefficients for the GENCO and PhT is its total output at hour h. Then,
let µh be the bid curve multiplying factor at hour h so that the GENCO bid curve at hour h is given by:
BCh = ρ+ µhβPhT . (20)
The value of µh then defines the GENCO’s bidding strategy at hour h. For a scheduling period of H time periods,
the set of bid factors U = {µ1, µ2, µ3, . . . , µH} constitutes the GENCO’s bidding strategy.
1the subscript i indicating the GENCO number is dropped to improve readability of the equations.
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Figure 4. Profit Maximization procedure for a given bidding strategy.
For a given bidding strategy, the procedure used to determine a profit maximization schedule is shown in
Figure 4. Given a particular bidding strategy, the reference marginal cost curve, forecasted competitor bid curves,
and the hourly demand curves, the GENCO can forecast the market’s supply and demand curves and hence the
market equilibrium point as illustrated in section 2.. As seen from Figure 4, this gives the GENCO’s spot market
allocations and the MCPs (spot market prices). The spot market data is then combined with the bilateral market
data (demand and prices) which is fed to a profit maximization algorithm to determine the optimal UC schedules
and hence the profit associated with the bidding strategy U .
5.2. EPSO Algorithm
Different bidding strategies give different spot market allocations and hence different optimal UC sched-
ules. Thus, an algorithm that determines the optimal bidding strategy is implemented in this paper using the
EPSO algorithm [18]. In the solution of the OBS-PBUC problem, a particle represents a candidate solution to the
problem which in this case is a set of bid factors with one bid factor for each time period of the scheduling hori-
zon. Given a scheduling period of H hours, the jth particle after k iterations Uj,k = {µ1j,k, µ2j,k, µ3j,k, . . . , µHj,k}
represents a position in the H-dimension solution space. The particle also has an associated velocity Vj,k =
{v1j,k, v2j,k, v3j,k, . . . , vHj,k} and an associated set of weights Wj,k = {w0j,k, w1j,k, w2j,k}. The velocity represents
a direction in which the particle is moving in the solution space while the weights govern the direction of par-
ticle movement. w0j,k governs the particle’s inertia habit, w
1




A step by step outline of the procedure used to solve the OBS-PBUC problem using the EPSO algorithm
follows.
Step 1: Initialization:
Randomly initialize J particles Uj,0 j = 1, 2, . . . , J . Each particle is a set of H bid factors defining a particular
bidding strategy. For each particle, an optimal unit commitment schedule is obtained using the profit maximization
procedure shown in Figure 4. The obtained profit PFj,0 is the particle’s initial fitness value. Each initialized
particle is stored as pBestj ; the corresponding fitness values as the best fitness values; and the fittest particle of all
initialized particles as initial gBest.
Step 2: Set the algorithm generation counter k = 1.
Step 3: Set the particles counter j = 1.
Step 4: Replication
Each particle is replicated R times i.e. R new particles are created as:
Urj,k = Uj,k, r = 1, 2, . . . R. (21)
Step 5: Set the particles replica counter r = 0.
Step 6: Mutation
The weights for replica r of particle j are mutated as:
wl,rj,k+1 = w
l,0
j,k + τwlN(0, 1), l = 0, 1, 2; (22)
where τwl is the standard deviation of the random mutation of weight parameter wl.
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Step 7: Reproduction
A new offspring is generated according to the particle movement rule2:
Urj,k+1 = Urj,k + V rj,k+1, r = 0, 1, 2, . . . R, (23)
where
V rj,k+1 = w
0,r









In (24), the gBestk value is disturbed to give gBest∗k using:
gBest∗k = gBestk + τgN(0, 1) (25)
where τg is the standard deviation of the random disturbance of the gBest value.
Step 8: Fitness Evaluation
An optimal UC schedule is obtained using the procedure described by Figure 4. The profit obtained from the
optimal UC schedule is is the offspring’s fitness.
Step 9: Increase the replica counter by 1. If all replicas have been evaluated, go to Step 10, else go back to Step 6.
Step 10: Updating pBest
The fitness values of particle j’s offspring are used to update the pBestj,k.
Step 11: Selection
One offspring is chosen to survive to the next generation through a stochastic tournament. The stochastic tourna-
ment is carried out as follows:
• The fittest between the particle’s offspring is determined.
• This particle survives to the next generation with a probability pluck while the other particles survive with a
probability (1− pluck) /R.
• If pluck is set to 1 then the best particle will always be chosen (pure elitism selection) while if pluck is set to
1/(R+ 1), there will pure random selection.
Step 12: Increase the particle counter by 1. If all particles have been evaluated, go to Step 13, else go back to Step
4.
Step 13: Updating gBest
The original gBestk−1 value and the highest profit from the pBestj,k values are used to update the gBestk value.
Step 14: Increase the algorithm generations counter by 1. If K generations have been exhausted, go to Step 15,
else go back to Step 3.
Step 15: Store gBestK and its corresponding UC schedule as the optimal solution and STOP.
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
6.1. Test System
The IEEE 118-bus system data [26, 27] was used to simulate a deregulated electricity market environment
with three GENCOs of different sizes in terms of installed capacity of generators. The three GENCOs operate
several of the 54 thermal units in the IEEE 118-bus test system and the generating units data are given in Tables
3, 4, and 5 for GENCOs A, B, and C respectively. The generator cost coefficients are scaled up from the values
given in [27] so as to give more realistic energy prices. Based on the installed capacity, GENCO A controls 60%
(4340 MW out of 7220 MW) of the system capacity; GENCO B controls 30% (2140 MW out of 7220 MW);
while GENCO C controls 10% (740 MW out of 7220 MW) of the system capacity. The reference linear marginal
cost curves for each of the three GENCOs and the aggregated system marginal cost curve are shown in Figure
5. The marginal cost curves show that GENCO A operates the cheaper units while GENCO C operates the most
expensive units. Nominal market clearing prices αhs corresponding a spot market demand P
h
D can be read off from
the aggregated reference marginal cost curve of Figure 5(b). Additionally, linear demand curves are assumed for








2U0j,k refers to the original particle while U1j,k , U2j,k, . . . refer to the replica particles.
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Equation (26) implies that a 100% increase in the spot market price would result in a 20% reduction in the spot
market demand.
A 24-hour (day ahead) scheduling period is applied and the load level is shown in Figure 6. Apart from
the allocations in the spot market, GENCO A is assumed to have a bilateral load demand equivalent to 10% of of
the system spot market demand (Figure 6) at a constant price of $45/MWh. A contract of differences factor (κ in
equation (7)) is set at 0.1. GENCOs B and C are assumed to have no bilateral commitments. The price of reserve
power (both spinning and non-spinning) is set at a constant $4.50/MW.
Table 3. GENCO A’s Generator Data
Unit No. of Pmini P
max
i Capacity a b c MUT MDT RU RD HSC CSC CShr
Code Units [MW] [MW] [MW] [$/h] [$/MWh] [$/MWh2] [hrs] [hrs] [MW] [MW] [$/h] [$/h] [hrs]
A1 2 100 420 840 128.32 16.68 0.0212 10 10 210 210 250 500 20
A2 8 100 300 2400 13.56 25.78 0.0218 8 8 150 150 110 220 16
A3 2 50 250 500 56.00 24.66 0.0048 8 8 125 125 100 200 16
A4 1 50 200 200 13.56 25.78 0.0218 8 8 100 100 400 800 16
A5 3 25 100 300 20.30 35.64 0.0256 5 5 50 50 50 100 10
A6 2 25 50 100 117.62 45.88 0.0195 2 2 25 25 45 90 4
Total 18 4340
Table 4. GENCO B’s Generator Data
Unit No. of Pmini P
max
i Capacity a b c MUT MDT RU RD HSC CSC CShr
Code Units [MW] [MW] [MW] [$/h] [$/MWh] [$/MWh2] [hrs] [hrs] [MW] [MW] [$/h] [$/h] [hrs]
B1 1 100 350 350 65.92 21.50 0.0060 8 8 175 175 100 200 16
B2 1 100 300 300 65.92 21.50 0.0060 8 8 150 150 440 880 16
B3 2 50 200 400 78.00 26.58 0.0088 8 8 100 100 100 200 16
B4 8 25 100 800 20.30 35.64 0.0256 5 5 50 50 50 100 10
B5 1 20 50 50 117.62 45.88 0.0195 2 2 25 25 45 90 4
B6 8 5 30 240 63.34 52.49 0.1393 1 1 15 15 40 80 2
Total 21 2140
Table 5. GENCO C’s Generator Data
Unit No. of Pmini P
max
i Capacity a b c MUT MDT RU RD HSC CSC CShr
Code Units [MW] [MW] [MW] [$/h] [$/MWh] [$/MWh2] [hrs] [hrs] [MW] [MW] [$/h] [$/h] [hrs]
C1 4 25 100 400 20.30 35.64 0.0256 5 5 50 50 50 100 10
C2 1 30 80 80 48.66 30.94 0.0918 3 3 40 40 45 90 6
C3 6 5 30 180 63.34 52.49 0.1393 1 1 15 15 40 80 2
C4 4 5 20 80 35.90 75.39 0.0566 1 1 10 10 30 60 2
Total 15 740

















































Aggregated for all GENCOs
(a) (b)
Figure 5. (a) Individual marginal cost curves for the three GENCOs and (b) aggregated system marginal cost curve.
First, in section 6.2. a discussion of the nominal system equilibrium is presented i.e. the market prices,
spot market load allocations, and expected GENCO profits (results of the PBUC) if each GENCO were to bid its
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Figure 6. Spot market demand curve.nominal bid curve as shown in Figure 5(a). Then, the solution to the OBS-PBUC problem for each of the three
GENCOs using the proposed EPSO algorithm is presented in section 6.3.. Finally, in section 6.4., a comparison of
the simulations results using the proposed EPSO algorithm and the classical PSO algorithm is presented.
6.2. Nominal System Equilibrium
The spot market demand curve plotted in Figure 6 shows the load varying from a low of 2900 MW at
midnight to a maximum of 6100 MW at 10 AM. If all three GENCOs bid their reference marginal cost curves, the
hourly market clearing prices (MCPs) will be as shown in Figure 7(a). As expected, the MCP curve follows the
spot market load with a minimum value of $34.17/MWh at midnight and a peak of $57.82/MWh 10 AM. Also
shown in Figure 7(b) is the hourly allocation of the spot market load to the three GENCOs. Figure 7(b) shows that
GENCO A gets most of the load and is actually limited during the peak hours of 8 AM to 4 PM by its capacity
less the bilateral market demand. GENCO B supplies mainly the intermediate load with the allocation of 1978
MW at 10 AM almost equaling its capacity of 2140 MW. GENCO C primarily acts as a peak load generator only
supplying energy during the peak hours. During the low peak hours before 5 AM, GENCO C receives no allocation
thus only receiving payments from sale of reserve power.




















































GENCO A: 78,140 MWh (70.2%)
GENCO B: 29,660 MWh (26.6%)
GENCO C:  3,550 MWh (  3.2%)
(a) (b)
Figure 7. (a) Hourly MCPs corresponding to the nominal marginal cost curves and (b) spot market allocations for
each individual GENCO.
Also shown in Figure 7(b) is the total daily energy to be supplied by the three GENCOs in the spot market.
it is observed that GENCO A is allocated 70.2% of the spot market demand during the day while GENCOs B and
C are allocated only 26.6% and 3.2% respectively. While GENCO B’s allocation compares relatively well to
its installed capacity (30% relative to the system capacity) GENCO A’s allocation is significantly higher than its
relative installed capacity while GENCO C’s allocation is significantly lower than its relative installed capacity.
Again, this is because GENCO A has cheaper units hence is usually allocated first while GENCO C has more
expensive units and is allocated last. A Profit Based Unit Commitment algorithm was run for each of the three
GENCOs with the base case spot market allocations shown in Figure 7(b) and the the expected values of daily
revenue, operating costs, and profits for each GENCO are shown in Table 6.
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Table 6. Revenues, costs, and profits for nominal bidding strategies.
GENCO A GENCO B GENCO C
REVENUES
Spot Market 3, 523, 184 1, 369, 344 177, 640
Reserve Sales 59, 434 86, 817 56, 838
Bilateral Market 501, 075 − −
CFDs 2, 922 − −
TOTAL REVENUE 4, 086, 615 1, 456, 161 234, 479
TOTAL COST 2, 620, 007 914, 826 148, 268
PROFIT 1, 466, 608 541, 335 86, 211
6.3. Optimal Bidding Strategy
The OBS-PBUC problem was solved using the EPSO algorithm described in section 5.2. for each of the
three GENCOs assuming that each is acting independently and using the competing GENCO’s nominal marginal
cost curves as the expected competitor bidding curves in each case. Values for the various parameters used in the
EPSO algorithm are given in Table 7. Simulation results including the optimal values of the hourly bid factors, the
expected MCPs, spot market allocations, revenues, costs, and profits are discussed next.
Table 7. Parameter values for EPSO algorithm.
Parameter Value
no. of particles 20
no. of iterations 500
initial value of weight w0 0.4
initial value of weight w1 1.0
initial value of weight w2 2.0
standard deviation of weights, τwl 0.1
standard deviation of gBest, τg 0.01
no. of replica particles 1
probability of best particle surviving, pluck 0.8
The hourly values of the bid factors that give the maximum profits defines a GENCO’s optimal bidding
strategy. Figure 8 shows the obtained values of the optimal bid strategies for the three GENCOs. As seen from
Figure 8 , the optimal values of the hourly bidding factors are in the range of 2.0 to 4.3 for GENCO A, 0.9 to 1.8
for GENCO B, and 0.5 to 1.3 for GENCO C. The interpretation here is that GENCO A should generally bid higher
than its nominal bidding curve, GENCO B should bid just slightly higher than its nominal bidding curve while
GENCO C should bid lower than its nominal bidding curve in order to maximize their respective profits.
Figures 9 (a), (b), and (c) show how the optimal bidding strategy for each GENCO would alter the hourly
spot market clearing prices. GENCO A’s high bidding factors significantly raise the MCPs; GENCO B’s strategy
would slightly raise the MCPs while GENCO C’s strategy has almost no effect on the MCPs. These results confirm
that GENCO C is in fact a price taker while GENCO A is a price maker with significant market power to alter the
MCPs. The effect of the optimal bidding strategies on the spot market allocations are shown in Figures 9 (d), (e),
and (f). GENCO A’s optimal bidding strategy would significantly reduce its allocation in the spot market; GENCO
B’s optimal bidding strategy would slightly reduce its allocation in the spot market; while GENCO C’s optimal
bidding strategy would significantly increase its allocation in the spot market during peak hours.
Comparisons of the revenues, costs, and profits for each of the three GENCO’s are given in Tables 8,
9, and 10. Table 8 — corresponding to GENCO A — shows a reduction in the revenues from the spot market
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Figure 8. Optimal hourly bid factors.






























































OptimalGENCO A GENCO B GENCO C
(a) (b) (c)











































































OptimalGENCO A GENCO B GENCO C
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 9. Effect of individual GENCO optimal bidding strategies on the MCPs and the spot market allocations.
resulting from the reduced allocations due to the optimal bidding strategy. However the reduction in operating
costs coupled with revenues from the increased reserve sales and CFDs gives an overall increase in profits. These
results show that it is more beneficial for GENCO A to bid high to increase the MCPs even though this may reduce
its spot market allocations and its spot market revenues as a result.
Table 9 — corresponding to GENCO B — shows similar results to those of GENCO A though to a
lesser extent. The reduction in operating costs coupled with revenues from the increased reserve sales outweighs
reduction in spot market revenues resulting from the reduced allocations due to the optimal bidding strategy.
However, GENCO B achieves only a 13.3% increase in profits compared to a 38.1% increase for GENCO A. This
is a consequence of the GENCO A’s market power enabling it to have a greater influence on the MCPs a result that
is also deduced from Figures 9 (a) and (b).
Table 10 — corresponding to GENCO C — shows that for the smallest GENCO the optimal bidding
GENCO Optimal Bidding Strategy and Profit Based Unit Commitment using Evolutionary ... (Adline K. Bikeri)
2010 ISSN: 2088-8708
Table 8. GENCO A revenues, costs, and profits for optimal bidding strategy.
Nominal Optimal Difference
REVENUES
Spot Market 3, 523, 184 2, 768, 844 −754, 340
Reserve Sales 59, 434 189, 213 +129, 779
Bilateral Market 501, 075 501, 075 0
CFDs 2, 922 85, 562 +82, 640
Total Revenues 4, 086, 615 3, 544, 694 −541, 921
Total Costs 2, 620, 007 1, 518, 954 −1, 101, 053
Profits [$/day] 1, 466, 608 2, 025, 739 +559, 131
(+38.1%)
Table 9. GENCO B revenues, costs, and profits for optimal bidding strategy.
Nominal Optimal Difference
REVENUES
Spot Market 1, 369, 344 1, 221, 779 −147, 565
Reserve Sales 86, 817 108, 219 +21, 402
Bilateral Market − − −
CFDs − − −
Total Revenues 1, 456, 161 1, 329, 998 −126, 163
Total Costs 914, 826 716, 916 −197, 910
Profits [$/day] 541, 335 613, 082 71, 747
(+13.3%)
strategy is to bid low in order to capture slightly more of the spot market demand. As seen from Table 10, the net
increase in revenues (increase in spot market revenues less reductions in reserve sales) is greater than the increase
in operating costs for supplying more energy. However, the final increase in profits (+3.7%) is relatively small
when compared to the profit increases realized by GENCOs A and B. Again this is attributed to GENCO C’s
relative weakness in the electricity market.
Table 10. GENCO C revenues, costs, and profits for optimal bidding strategy.
Nominal Optimal Difference
REVENUES
Spot Market 177, 640 228, 785 51, 145
Reserve Sales 56, 838 52, 467 −4, 371
Bilateral Market − − −
CFDs − − −
Total Revenues 234, 479 281, 252 46, 773
Total Costs 148, 268 191, 856 43, 588
Profits [$/day] 86, 211 89, 396 3, 185
(+3.7%)
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The relationship between the GENCO market power (measured by the GENCO’s relative size in the
market) and the effect of their optimal bidding strategies on the market dynamics are summarized in Table 11.
Table 11. Effect of GENCO market power on market prices, allocations, and individual profits.




Average % change in spot energy
market prices
+31.4% +7.2% −0.8%
Average % change in spot energy
market allocations
−41.5% −18.1% +30.8%
% change in expected profits +38.1% +13.3% +3.7%
6.4. Comparison of EPSO and PSO algorithms
The performance of the EPSO algorithm implemented in this paper was compared to the performance
of a similar implementation using the classical PSO algorithm. The problem was solved for the three GENCOs
20 times using both algorithms starting from the same initial particles in each trial. The same parameter values
(i.e. number of particles, number of iterations, and weight values) given in Table 12 for the EPSO algorithm were
used for the implemented PSO algorithm. The performance of the two algorithms was measured in terms of the
objective function values from the 20 runs. Table 12 gives the best, average, and worst solutions obtained for both
algorithms for each of the three GENCOs. Also given in Table 12 is the standard deviation for the solutions. The
table shows that the proposed EPSO algorithm outperforms the classical PSO algorithm in all cases. The superior
performance of the EPSO algorithm is attributed to the mutation characteristics embedded in the algorithm which
tune the algorithm parameters in subsequent generations hence resulting in a better search of the solution space.
Table 12. Comparison of solution quality using PSO and EPSO algorithms.
GENCO A GENCO B GENCO C
PSO EPSO PSO EPSO PSO EPSO
Best solution [$/day] 1, 954, 488 2, 025, 739 610, 497 613, 082 88, 703 89, 396
Average solution [$/day] 1, 903, 261 1, 967, 363 598, 663 600, 745 87, 987 88, 982
Worst solution [$/day] 1, 850, 798 1, 931, 389 584, 485 585, 105 87, 293 88, 482
Standard deviation [$/day] 40, 644 31, 811 7, 348 6, 365 348 262
7. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a methodology for determining an optimal bidding strategy and unit commitment
for a GENCO operating in a competitive electricity market place. The proposed procedure seeks to determine
how a GENCO should structure its hourly bid curves so as to maximize profits where profit is calculated as the
difference between expected revenues and generation costs for expected GENCO own demand. GENCO demand
is determined as the sum of allocations from the spot market and bilateral market commitments. The complex
optimization problem is solved using an evolutionary particle swarm optimization (EPSO) technique. Numerical
results from simulations of a typical system with three GENCOs of different sizes confirms the effectiveness of the
proposed algorithm. Generally, it is shown that large GENCOs with significant market power could raise their bids
– thereby significantly raising electricity prices – and hence increasing their profits; though the higher bids could
reduce their allocations in the spot market. Smaller GENCOs with less market power are generally price takers and
have relatively less influence on the market equilibrium. The optimization algorithm results in only slight increases
in expected profits for these GENCOs. Finally, a comparison of solution quality from the proposed EPSO algorithm
with those obtained using the classic PSO algorithm shows that the proposed methodology performs much better.
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